

SPEECH

by

LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS

before

U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY HISTORY CLUB

Annapolis, Maryland

Gentlemen:

I am very happy to be here tonight. I have always had, since those landings in North Africa, a great sense of debt to the United States Navy. If it were not for the United States Navy, I don't think I'd be here tonight. During those landings I was sent ashore a little in advance of most of the main events with the mission of kidnapping 16 crane operators in their homes and getting them down to the dock so that at daybreak when the ships sailed in they could be unloaded. I've kept my fingers crossed hoping that either the Statute of Limitations will cover me or the Senate Select Committee will not stumble on this event of my dim and distant past.

But during that night at daybreak, or even before daybreak, we were being shelled by some French coastal batteries and we had a Navy fire-control party ashore with us. None of us had ever seen any artillery bursts at anything like close range before, and we were all quite horrified at how black and how red and how unpleasant it was. And we said to this naval fire-control party, "Do something at once." So they got on their little radios and were talking out to the battleship New York, and it fired and I was amazed that you can see these big 12-inch shells, I think they were,

as they came across the sky, and they fell quite far behind the French gun batteries. And the French fired at us again and it was closer and more unpleasant. And we were very agitated with the naval fire-control party and told them to do something, and they said, "Yes." They were equally agitated since they were with us. The third salvo was in the gunpits, and those guns fired no more at us that night. Many states kept their ships like North Carolina, Alabama, and Texas, and if anybody in New York wanted to take a subscription, I would have been the generous subscriber to the preservation of the immortality of the battleship New York.

I came tonight to talk to you about what I honestly believe to be the oldest profession in the world. You're thinking of the one popularly believed to be the oldest profession in the world. But you see the reason why I say intelligence is the oldest profession in the world is somebody had to know where it was before the other could be exercised. But basically I want to talk to you a little bit about intelligence. What is it? Principally, it is information on the actions, capabilities, and intentions of foreign powers that may in some way impact on our life and the future of our nation and may affect the way we live.

Why do we need it? We need it because we live in the smallest world in which Americans have ever lived. When we were told by one of our early Presidents that eternal vigilance was the price of liberty, he was talking about a United States with a two-or three-month cushion on either side. James Madison once said that he hadn't heard from his minister in Spain for two years, and that if he didn't hear from him within the next year he was certainly going to send someone to see what was going on in Spain.

We live now in a time of almost instant communication and instant requirement for decisions. In the old days events took place and matured slowly and the policymakers had plenty of time to decide what they were going to do about various things. Now, almost every day there is a cascade of events bursting upon them, all of them requiring some action as to what they should do. Now the United States has a very peculiar history in intelligence. During all our wars we always built up a very effective intelligence system, and then we have promptly proceeded to demolish it as soon as the war was over. There is something in our American soul -- I'm sorry but I think it is sort of a pharisaical streak -- that says, "O Lord I thank thee that I am not like those dirty British, French, Russians and Germans who engage in spying.

We are pure and noble and don't do this sort of thing." And this is a great delusion we have about ourselves nationally that doesn't correspond to history.

Out at the CIA we have a statue of Nathan Hale. It was put there over my energetic protest. Not that Nathan Hale wasn't a very brave young man who made a very immortal statement about regretting that he only had one life to give to his country, but he was after all an intelligence agent who was caught on his first mission, and he had all the evidence cleverly placed in his shoe. He went to Manhattan to find out where the British were going to land and when. They were already there when he got there. And this was a very expensive mistake. In addition to that, before he went he committed a breach of secrecy. He told one of his friends that he was going to go do this, and the guy looked at him and said, "But Nathan, how can you stoop so low." So we already had at the early stage of our life this business about spying is not American.

But George Washington didn't feel that way. George Washington was probably the most avid user of intelligence in American history. There is one very remarkable letter which he wrote to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Eliás Dayton, in which he said roughly this: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I

have nothing further to add on this score. All that remains for me is to tell you that these matters must be kept as secret as possible. For lack of such secrecy these enterprises generally fail no matter how promising the outlook. I am, sir, your obedient servant - George Washington."

On another occasion, he spent the night at the home of a revolutionary sympathizer, a Mr. Holcomb in Connecticut. In the morning he got out, climbed up on his horse, and Mrs. Holcomb came out and said, "Pray General, where do you ride tonight?" And he leaned down from the saddle and said, "Madame, can you keep a secret?" And she said, "Of course." He said, "So can I madame," tipped his hat and rode off.

So we haven't always had this great passion about telling everybody everything. We had Mr. Stimson, our distinguished Secretary of State and later Secretary of War. In 1932 he was handed a decoded message of a foreign country, and he piously averted his head, and held out his hand and said, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." Ten years later as Secretary of War he couldn't get his hands on enough other gentlemen's mail. But this kind of mentality led us to Pearl Harbor. Now we were lucky at Pearl Harbor -- the carriers weren't there. We had time. We recovered from the naval Pearl Harbor. Can anybody recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor? That is the question

we must ask ourselves, as to whether we need intelligence, and whether we need it fast or not.

It was Pearl Harbor that led to the creation of the CIA. In the last great investigation we had, in 1946, everybody was trying to saddle somebody else with the blame for Pearl Harbor. But what was generally agreed was that squirreled away in various places in the US Government there were pieces of information which, had they been brought together at any central point, would have enabled us, if not to prevent Pearl Harbor, at least to minimize the damage. Hence the name of the Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, which was created to try and centralize all of the information flowing into the US Government.

Now who collects intelligence in the US Government? More people than you would suspect. The Defense Department collects intelligence, the three services collect intelligence of particular interest to them, the Treasury collects intelligence, the Atomic Energy or the Energy Research and Development Administration collects intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency collects intelligence, and the State Department collects intelligence. In fact I would say roughly 50 percent of the intelligence in our various publications comes from some overt source, having nothing

to do with secrecy. But of course the overt information is generally the easiest one to obtain.

How do we collect this intelligence? Well, we collect it in various ways. We collect it overtly by reading the newspaper, by listening to broadcasts, and television programs and so forth. And you would be surprised how much intelligence can be derived from this. For instance, in World War II one of the chief sources of order of battle we had on the German Army on the Eastern Front was death notices in German newspapers. They would tell you about somebody who was killed in such or such a unit, such or such an area, on the Eastern Front. And this, with some delay, gave you a fairly good idea of the location of many of these units.

One of the things I want to emphasize about intelligence is the need that it be timely. If you don't get it back in time it isn't intelligence, it is history. And you could learn from it, but not to the same degree as if you have some tactical requirement upon you.

Now the second way we collect intelligence, and this is one of the areas in which America has brought great contributions to the whole business of intelligence, is by the various complicated technical systems, -- by the overhead photography, by the various electronics, by all the other extraordinary systems which we use and to which the ingenuity



that has taken us to the moon has been applied. This is the really costly area of intelligence. It is extraordinarily productive. It will tell you what is there physically. However, there is only one way to get inside people's heads, or under a roof, and that is with people. We face extraordinary closed disciplined societies, which is one of the reasons why the clandestine collection of intelligence is important to us.

Now when you have collected intelligence by all of these means, one of the most important things you have to do is analyze it. Here again the United States has, I think, as broad an analytical capability to bring to bear, in excess of anything that the history of intelligence shows us in any other country in the past.

And finally, we work with friendly foreign services, who often have great access in areas where we do not, and I would not want you to think that some of these friendly intelligence services were not pretty good.

When I went to Italy in 1960, I was briefed at CIA and I was briefed at the Defense Department. And they said, "Well, the Italians have a pretty good intelligence service, but they don't really have a lot of money and a lot of people, but it's all right." So I went to Italy, and the Italian intelligence service was centralized in a way that

would make the United States Congress shudder and fall upon the ground, because the FBI, the CIA, the DIA, and the NSA are all of the same service. And I arranged for my first trip as attache to visit the Italian Third Corps in Milan with the Chief of Service who wore a monocle and looked more like the Chief of Spies than anybody you ever saw in any James Bond movie. In fact, he had been captured by the Germans once in a building; he jumped out of the second floor and, according to eye witnesses, when he landed running, the monocle was still in place.

So I took off, and the Pentagon was having one of its periodic economy drives, so I didn't take my driver since he got more per diem as a civilian than I did as a colonel. I drove the car myself figuring that when I got to Milan the Italians would take me and give me a car and a driver and so forth. Now I spent the first night at the US Base at Leghorn, so there weren't any of these little cards at the hotels all over the world to send into the local police about foreigners who were staying in the hotel. The next day, instead of going straight to Milan, I remembered a great restaurant in Florence where they had the best green lasagna that I had ever eaten. So I thought what difference would it make, I'd just get to Milan an hour or two later and my program

doesn't start until tomorrow. So I turned and drove into Florence, and in a foreign country I usually drove with one eye on the rear vision mirror to see whether I saw the same face or wheels or combination thereof, and I didn't. And I drove into Florence and parked in front of the station. I walked three blocks to this restaurant, and the green lasagna was great. While I was eating a man came up to me, clicked his heels (I was in civilian clothes), and said, "Signor Colonello, there have been several changes in your program in Milan, and the Chief of Service wanted to be sure you had them before you got there."

Now since Florence is a city of 720,000 people, I understood that what I was getting was a demonstration that my friend with the monocle knew where I was and what I was doing. So, I was duly impressed with this, and everything went on and fourteen years passed.

In my present job I went to Italy and I saw the Italian intelligence people in Rome, and I was supposed to see the French on the following Monday. So I thought I'd drive up and look at my World War II battlefields and I did. I went up to Florence, rented a car, parked the car at the hotel and went for a walk. It was about one o'clock, and I suddenly remembered we were hungry. I said, "Gee, I know a great restaurant here with great green lasagna."

So we went over to the restaurant and the green lasagna was as good as ever. There was just another zero on the bill, but I decided outside of that everything was the same. At the end of it, I called the waiter and said, "May I have the bill please?" And the waiter said, "Signor (I was in civilian clothes), Signor Generale, there is no bill." And I said, "What do you mean, no bill?" The young man at the next table stood up and he said, "General, I am Captain Manichelli. In order that you may know that in 12 years the service has not lost its skill -- once again you are the guest of the Chief of Service." So I think we should remember that these services can be very helpful to us.

Now we face a world in which there is much talk of detente, and I think most of us do think seriously about it, or are hopeful that detente may lead into a lessening of tensions to the advantage to both sides. The advantage to both sides is fundamental. But in this respect, I recall the story of two young Americans who went to Moscow. They were being shown around by a young Russian, and after he had shown them the Novodevichy Monastery, and the Hall of Congresses and the Kremlin, he took them out to the zoo, where they saw the various animals. In one of the cages they saw this huge Russian bear and in the same cage was a rather worried looking lamb, but he was in pretty good shape. They were a

little puzzled at the idea of putting the two in the same cage, so they said to the young Russian, "Why do you put the two in the same cage?" And the young Russian said, "Oh, this is to prove that peaceful coexistence is possible." The young American said, "Well it is pretty impressive" and his buddy said, "it is pretty convincing." The young Russian looked around and seeing no one near said, "Of course you understand, every morning you have to put in a new lamb." The Russians themselves, who are very fond of proverbs, put it very well. They have an old Russian proverb that says "when you make friends with a bear, hold on to your axe."

Why do we need this intelligence? Well we need this intelligence because the capabilities deployed against the United States today are greater than any other time since Valley Forge. Throughout American history we faced continental powers. Now for the first time, we face another global power. Germany, at the height of its power, was essentially a European power. The Germans could affect us with submarine warfare and so forth, but really they had no capabilities to strike crippling blows to the United States. This is no longer true. The Soviet Union is a global power. The Soviet Union is capable and willing, as Angola has shown, to project its power ten thousand kilometers from the Soviet Union. We see the Soviet Union at the present time, in the midst of

detente, deploying five new systems of third-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with greater throw weight, each with greater accuracies than any of the systems which they are replacing. On many of these systems we see them deploying multiple warheads. We see the Soviet Navy, having gone from a coast-guard-type navy to a blue-water navy, present all over the world. We see the Soviets building aircraft carriers. We see them building more and larger submarines, capable of launching larger ballistic missiles, with even greater range than before. We see them upgrading continuously their conventional forces, the Army, and the Air Force. We see them developing aircraft with the capabilities against the United States, and most of all, those buffers of time and other powers that used to stand between us and any potential aggressor are no longer there. We no longer have three months; we have half an hour. So we must know what is going on on the other side.

And what do we spend and what do we do to get this intelligence? Less than one cent out of every dollar spent by the United States Government goes for the collection of intelligence. The relative cost of intelligence has declined since 1969. The personnel devoted to intelligence has declined by 40 percent since 1949. Intelligence has declined

both as a percentage of the defense budget or of Federal expenditures.

Intelligence provides us with clear up-to-date information on what is going on in the world and provides a solid foundation for the foreign policy of the United States. Knowledge is power, and if we know our government can form its foreign policy on the basis of strength.

Good intelligence provides us a sound basis for deciding what we need as a nation to ensure our own survival, for deciding what is necessary to make deterrence work. In the early 1960s, we had a great debate in the United States on a missile gap -- whether there was or was not a missile gap. Such a debate is impossible today. We know what they have, and more important, they know we know. Good intelligence enables us to plan for contingencies, for the contingency employment of our forces, and the very fact that the United States has a good intelligence capability inhibits any nation that might think of moving against us. People tend to think of intelligence as purely a force for waging of war, but it is also a force for waging of peace. No President of the United States could sign any arms limitation agreement unless he had the means of verifying whether it is being complied with.

Another factor, for which you get no credit, is that sometimes we have been able to use intelligence to reassure two friends who were about to jump at one another's throat. I myself have been sent on such a mission to show country A that country B was not going to jump them, and to show country B that country A was not going to jump them. If we did not have good intelligence, the cost of the United States defense establishment would soar out of sight. Unless we knew what it was we were preparing against, what would be the limitation or the constraint upon our requirements to meet it? You would have an arms race that could lead to a tinderbox. It is the clear precise knowledge of the Soviet strategic forces that enables us to know what we must have if we want to make deterrence work.

And now I want to touch on this question of covert action of which you have heard a great deal. This is the use by the United States of its clandestine services either to support our friends abroad, to thwart our enemies, or to move events in the country in a sense favorable to our interests. Now a lot of people will say we shouldn't be doing this. Well the fact is that every nation in history has been doing it since the dawn of history. And diplomacy itself is a form of trying to sway the opinion in a foreign country in a sense favorable to your interests.



This is the very spectacular part of intelligence that attracts everybody's attention. Actually it involves between five and six percent of our budget. It is a very small part of our budget, but it forestalls serious crises before they grow. As I say, it is a very old tradition and Americans particularly would be well advised not to be too harsh on covert action.

There were 17,000 French troops in North America before France declared war on Great Britain. The Bonhomme Richard was clandestinely given by the French Government to John Paul Jones. When the British accused the French of helping the Americans, the French demanded that the US Congress publicly state that it had received no aid from the French, and the US Congress, which badly needed that aid from the French, promptly passed a resolution saying that they had received no aid from the French. This type of action is a quiet way to help your friends resist Soviet aggression and subversion.

For today we face a new kind of war. A new kind of war that was best described by a Chinese author 25 centuries ago, by the name of Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu once said that "fighting was the crudest form of making war on your enemies." And then he went on to describe, 2,500 years ago, how you take your enemies apart. Let me tell you what he said: "Cover

with ridicule all of the valid traditions in your opponent's country. Involve their leaders in criminal enterprises, and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Aggravate by every means at your command all existing differences within your opponent's country. Agitate the young against the old." There are 13 of these. And he winds up with this maxim: "The acme of excellence is not to win a hundred victories and a hundred battles. The acme of excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies without ever having to fight them." And this is the invisible front on which we must also fight.

At this year when we are conducting investigations of our intelligence establishment, the Soviet Union is publishing a special stamp to honor the 50th anniversary of the KGB. So, we have not just the old front or the old forms of war, we have the new forms of war to worry about. Now what about these investigations into the US Intelligence Community, the CIA, the DIA, the FBI, and all the others?

First of all, I cannot tell you that in the last 27 years we have not had in CIA kooks, nuts, zealots, or people who have shown very poor judgment. We have. The cases have been blown up enormously. But the numbers are very few and far between. Seventy-six thousand people have passed through the CIA since it was founded. Not one of those has ever been indicted up

to today. Now I would submit that if you take any other community of 76,000 people and subject it to the kind of scrutiny to which we have been subjected for the last 36 months, I think our record would not look bad. Yes, we have had these people. But you must remember the last investigation we had was the Doolittle Investigation of the CIA. They came up with the finding that the United States was facing a ruthless foe bent on our destruction and that we must match their determination with ours and their ruthlessness with ours.

Yes, there have been abuses, but they have been few and far between. Let me just quote you an instance. You have heard of the telephone taps. Well, the CIA is accused of conducting 32 illegal telephone taps in 27 years. That is about one and one-third taps a year. The Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States Government who is charged by law with the protection of his sources and methods. We have always been reluctant to accept these things and talk about them, but the fact is that when the Congress set up the CIA in 1947, it set it up to engage in espionage. But they wouldn't say that. What the Act said was that we would do such other things as the National Security Council might prescribe. And this again follows this idea that we don't do this sort of thing.

I have cited some of the Washington things. Washington ran three separate attempts to kidnap Benedict Arnold, and

I think we all know what he was going to do with him when he got him. He also attempted to kidnap a British midshipman in New York who happened to be Prince William of Britain, who later became King William IV, and there was some shooting outside the Prince's house. Now Franklin, for three years, before the Revolution when we were all loyal subjects of George the Third, was the Assistant Postmaster of British North America. Do you know what he was doing? He was opening that British mail like crazy, and they caught him and fired him. So he went off to Paris and represented the Revolution. In Paris he had the French build him a printing press. Do you know what he printed on his printing press? British currency, British passports, and fabricated atrocity stories for publication in the British press. In the meantime, I might add, the British were working very hard at penetrating his office and did so very successfully. As a matter of fact, 42 hours after the French Government told Franklin that France was entering the war against Great Britain, that information was in the hands of the British Government in London, which is just about the time it would take you to ride there on a horse and cross the channel.

A couple of weeks ago I was down in Florida and I had lunch with Anthony Eden, who is now Lord Avon. He was telling me about an ancestor of his, Robert Eden, who had a very

tough time in Maryland because the Tories thought he was an American sympathizer, and the Americans thought he was a Tory sympathizer. He had a very hard time, and I said, "Yes, but in the meantime his brother, William Eden, was successfully penetrating the US mission in Paris." "Oh," he said, "you know about that, do you?" And they did. They were extremely successful in finding out what was going on.

We have this guilt complex about intelligence. Not long ago, the chief of a friendly foreign service made two observations to me. He said, "I don't understand why all of you Americans aren't Catholics." I said, "What does that have to do with it?" "Well," he said, "remember, it is the only religion that offers confession for everybody." And then he paused and he said, "I suppose it's the fact that it is private that's the real drawback."

And then he told me this story, which I think from my own experience is a fairly accurate one. He said, "On an island in the Pacific the cannibals captured three guys -- one was a Frenchman, one was an Englishman, and one was an American. The chief of the cannibals said, 'Men, I have bad news and good news for you. The bad news is that we are going to have you for lunch tomorrow and we will have to kill you early in the morning for the cooking to be through in

time. Now after the bad news you need some good news, and the good news is that I will give you anything you want, short of setting you free, in the meantime.' So he turned to the Frenchman, 'What do you want?' The Frenchman said, 'Well, if I'm going to be killed in the morning, I think I'd just as soon spend the remaining hours I have with that beautiful cannibal girl over there.' So they said 'Okay,' and they untied the Frenchman and he and the cannibal girl went off into the woods. Then they turned to the Englishman and they said, 'What do you want?' The Englishman said, 'I want a pen and paper.' They said 'What do you want a pen and paper for?' He said, 'I want to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations and protest against the unfair, unjust, and unsporting attitude you have adopted toward us.' So, they untied the Englishman, they gave him a hut, they gave him a pen and paper and he went in there and started to write. Then they said to the American 'What do you want?' The American said, 'I want to be led into the middle of the village. I want to be made to kneel down, and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end.' The chief said to his vice-chief, 'That is a weird request, but those Americans are a weird bunch anyway and since we promised, we have to do it.' So they untied the American and

led him into the middle of the village. They made him kneel down, the biggest cannibal took a running leap and kicked the American in the rear end and knocked him 15 feet. Now the American had been hiding a machine pistol under his clothing, and at this point he took out the machine pistol, cut down the nearby cannibals, and the rest fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the woods. The Englishman, hearing the gunfire, came out of his hut, and they looked at the American standing there with the smoking pistol, and they said, 'Do you mean to say that you had the gun all the time?' The American said, 'Sure.' They said, 'Why didn't you use it before now?' (This is the Frenchman telling me the story.) He said the American looked up and with an expression of hurt sincerity said, 'But you don't understand. It wasn't until he kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral grounds for such extreme action.'"

Those who oppose us know us well. They know what importance we as a people attach to fair play, to liberty, to the rights of our citizens, and to the open nature of our society. They can and do make full use of their advantage in not having any symbol of moral or operational constraints upon their actions in their attempts to alter or control our open society. Today we live in a tough world, in a tripolar world right

now, in which there is great tension between China and the Soviet Union.

There is an amusing story in that respect. They say when Mr. Nixon was in Moscow he was talking to Mr. Brezhnev, and Mr. Brezhnev said to him, "You know the other day I had a strange dream." Mr. Nixon said, "What was that?" Brezhnev said, "I dreamt that I was in Washington and I looked down Pennsylvania Avenue and there was a huge flag flying over the Capitol." Mr. Nixon said that it's the American flag, it flies whenever the Congress is in session. Brezhnev said, "No, it was not the American flag. It had something written on it." Mr. Nixon said, "What did it have written on it?" Brezhnev said, "It had written on it -- 'Capitalism is doomed.'" Mr. Nixon said, "That is strange. I had almost the same dream." Brezhnev said, "You too? What did you dream?" Mr. Nixon said, "I dreamt I was in Red Square and I looked at the Kremlin and on the highest tower of the Kremlin there was a huge flag flying." Brezhnev said, "It's the Soviet flag. It flies there day and night." Mr. Nixon said, "No it wasn't the Soviet flag, it had something written on it." Brezhnev said, "What did it have written on it?" Mr. Nixon said, "I wish I could tell you, but I can't read Chinese."



I just want to say one more word before I try to answer your questions. I am not an old CIA man. I came there for the first time four years ago. And if people ask me what is your feeling after it, I say first of all I feel a little bit like Jonah, because all of this started about the time I got there. But mostly I would say I could sum up my feelings by saying I'm reassured. I am reassured because these are Americans just like all other Americans who live by the same standards of right and wrong. And if we did as an Agency some of the things we're accused of doing, I wouldn't be the Deputy Director. We are under a very tough and difficult situation, producing the best intelligence any government has laid before it today. Yes, we failed to predict some things, but most of the things we are accused of failing to predict are things we ourselves drew attention to as our own view of what we failed in. Unfortunately, we have been in the habit of making post-mortems of our failures and no post-mortems of our successes.

We are prepared to live with whatever the Congress or the President does in this respect. We can live with any particular form of oversight, provided there is a modicum of discretion in it. We're an unusual people. We may even be able to run our secret intelligence service in Macy's window. But if we do, we'll be the only people in history who ever did.

I sense a great change in the feeling of the American people about all this. I think the American people understand that we who work in intelligence, whether it be in Defense or the FBI or Central Intelligence, know that the American people will not stand for secrecy being used to cover abuses. We know that we can only operate an intelligence service that will be in line with the general desires of the American people and what they think is acceptable at this time. We not only hope that they build into whatever guidelines they give us some mechanisms, but also that as the perceptions of the American people change as to what is acceptable, that they will let us know.

We had a bunch of young Congressmen out at CIA the other day and the question of assassination came up. I might add that when all this assassination talk is said and done, nobody was assassinated -- that was the ultimate finding. One of them said, "Yes, but if anybody could have gotten Hitler in 1943 or 1944, he would probably have been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross." Another young Congressman said, "But think if you could have gotten him in 1935 or 1936 how many lives you would have saved." And I said to the Congressmen, "Are you advocating assassination in peacetime? We were at peace with Germany in 1935." "Oh

yes, but that was different." Well the whole problem is that they are all different. I personally do not believe that assassination is an effective weapon. As a matter of fact, the CIA, long before any of these investigations, had put out a Directive in 1971 saying that it would not under any circumstances be considered. Basically, it is against the law of God, it is against the law of man, and it doesn't work very well. You generally produce another fanatic, who is even more fanaticized by this. So it doesn't work.

But as we go into the last quarter of this century, we have a number of questions that are vital to our people. I am fond of saying that we have four great questions to which those of us who work in intelligence owe answers to the American people.

Five years from today, who will be in control of the Soviet Union? What will be their feelings toward us, and toward our allies? What is there in Soviet research and development today that will impact upon us as a people five or ten years from now? And the same questions for China.

History has called upon us to fight on a silent battlefield on which we did not choose to fight, but upon which we have been forced to fight. The responsibility upon us is to inform the American Government. The CIA is not a secret government. The CIA does not have CIA policies.

The CIA does what it is told by the United States Government. When I go down to represent the Director at a meeting at the White House, I tell them what will happen if they take Option 1, 2, 3, or 4. One day I got an early lesson. Dr. Kissinger went around the table and he asked each person around (State, Defense, Treasury) what we should do. One said we should do it; we shouldn't do it; we should do it. He came to me and I said we shouldn't do it, and he said to me, "You don't have any vote." We are an information organization. With all this nonsense about Gestapos and everything else, we have never had power to arrest anybody.

We provide information to the United States Government. Yes, there have been abuses, but I am perfectly convinced that most of the people involved in these things thought they had proper authority. I think one of the positive things that has come out of the President's program is that any orders we get will have to be in writing, and that will make people think very carefully.

I am not really concerned about the future. That may sound strange to you, but I can remember the early part of the war when we were losing the Philippines, when everything bad was happening to us, and I said to an old general who was the head of military intelligence, "General, this is terrible. We are losing Singapore, the Malays, Dutch East

Indies, the Philippines, everything. What is going to happen?" He said, "Well, we are going to win this war. God bless my soul if I know how, but we are going to win this war." And really if you look at it, there are advantages on the other side from time to time. But you have to study history here, and if you look at the whole long course of human history in the 6,000 years which we have recorded, you will find that many tyrants have temporarily been able to stem the flow of human history in the direction of greater dignity for the individual. None of those tyrannies has ever been able to do it permanently. I don't think any of these medieval tyrannies that we face in modern dress will be able to do it either.

I am very happy to have this opportunity to talk to you who will be running our defense in the years ahead and will be carrying the torch beyond -- and that is a precious torch. There is no one behind us to pick it up if we drop it. And you, the young people in the Navy, are the guarantors of the tomorrows my generation will not see. I know that you will carry that torch as it has been carried before. We will have tough times and difficult times. I am only happy that I don't have to predict intelligence on the United States.

I was a young corporal in the Army in the summer of 1941. The whole of Western Europe was occupied by the Germans. The German advance in Russia was continuing at 30 miles a day, and the United States Congress voted for compulsory military service in the United States by a majority of one vote. Five months later we were at war in every theater around the world. As a people we are sometimes slow at these things, but we catch up and we move on.

I remember when the first Russian went into space we were told that we would have to go through the Russian customs to get to the moon. Twelve men have walked the silent face of the moon, and they all have been Americans.

We give a false impression. I was in China and they showed me a Chinese historical museum. My guide was a very bright little Chinese girl who spoke good English. She said, "What do you think of all of this? I said, "It gives me pause to think of the 6,000 years of your history compared to the 200 years of our history." And she smiled and said, "Yes, but that is only half a dynasty, isn't it?" I thought for a minute, and I said, "Yes, but in that half a dynasty we went from an empty continent to the silent face of the moon."

And when I see in our business--intelligence--the kind of genius and technical ability, the kind of dedication that has done the things that have happened in our past, I have

no fears about our tomorrows. I see the young people we're getting too. With all the storm and buffeting we have had, we have four times as many people applying to work at the CIA than at any time in its history. These are the young people coming out of our colleges.

I face the future as a very challenging one, a very difficult one. I feel we owe the American people some absolute answers. Winston Churchill told my generation that we would have as our companions on our journey blood, sweat, tears and toil. As you young people move forward to the center of the stage and take over the control of our life and our nation in the years ahead, I wish for you three companions on your journey: Faith, to light the road ahead; for dark is the road of the man who walks without faith; enthusiasm, which is the force that drives the young and keeps the older still productive; and, most of all, courage, because courage is the guarantee of all the other human virtues.